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Hargrove v. Ward, 138 Adv. Op. (Mar. 24, 2022)1
RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT: DISTRICT COURT MAY AWARD RETROACTIVE
CHILD SUPPORT IN ACTION INITIATED THREE YEARS AFTER CHILD REACHES
MAJORITY
SUMMARY
The Court examined whether a district court may award retroactive child support in a
paternity action initiated after the child reaches the age of majority. The Court further examined
the circumstances under which a parent’s promise to support a child is enforceable. The Court
concluded that one may, holding that the 3-year statute of limitations to bring a paternity action
after the child reaches the age of majority applies to a parent’s request for retroactive child support.
The Court also determined that a promise in writing to support a child is enforceable under NRS
126.900(1) when the writing sets forth a clear commitment to provide support in specific terms.
The district court correctly determined that no written promise was made here.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Lillian Hargrove and respondent Thomas Ward were never married but had one
child together, G.W. born December 3, 1999. Paternity is not disputed by the parties, and Ward is
named as the father of G.W.’s birth certificate. The parties never obtained a formal custody or
child support order during G.W.’s minority. Hargrove alleged that the parties agreed at that time
that instead of Ward paying child support, he would visit G.W. and remain actively involved in
G.W.’s life. Hargrove alleged that in April 2012 the parties verbally agreed that Ward would
deposit $400 per month into Hargrove’s bank account for support of G.W. Ward disputed that the
parties ever agreed to do so.
On March 12, 2019, 1 year and 3 months after G.W. turned 18, Hargrove filed a paternity
action against Ward in order to seek back child support. Hargrove asked the district court to
recognize the parties’ agreement for $400 a month under NRS 126.900(1). Hargrove argued that
even without an agreement, under 125B.030, she was entitled to retroactive child support. The
district court concluded that it did not have the legal authority to grant post-emancipation child
support. Hargrove appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ward did not make an enforceable promise under NRS 126.900(1)
This court reviews a district court’s order regarding a child support determination for an
abuse of discretion.2 “Questions of statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a
statute, are questions of law, which we review de novo.”3 This court will defer to and uphold the
district court’s findings that are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence.4
NRS 126.900(1) provides that “[a]ny promise in writing to furnish support for a child,
growing out of a supposed or alleged parent and child relationship, does not require consideration
and is enforceable according to its terms.” Specifically at issue here is the meaning of “promise in
writing.” Hargrove argued that text messages over a period of 11 months, banking records, and
her testimony show Ward’s promise in writing to make month child support payments under NRS
126.9000(1) and the statute should be interpreted to enforce informal agreements. The court
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disagreed finding that nothing in the statute supported Hargrove’s interpretation, and the statute
specifically forecloses a consideration requirement. Further, the court found that Legislature could
have directed informal commitments enforceable under the statute had it intended to. The court
reasoned that the banking records and Hargrove’s testimony did not demonstrate Ward’s
expression of intent to pay child support, and while text message may constitute a “writing,” the
text messages did not demonstrate a “promise” to make ongoing child support payments. The court
concluded that the phrase, “promise in writing” is unambiguous as used in the statute. The district
court did not abuse its discretion denying Hargrove’s NRS 126.900(1) claim.
NRS 125B.030 permits the recovery of retroactive child support after the child reaches the
age of majority.
The court held that a parent may file for retroactive child support after a child has reached
the age of majority under NRS 125B.030. The court reasoned that other statutes within NRS
Chapter 26 contemplate the imposition of retroactive support obligations in paternity actions filed
within 3 years after the child attains the age of majority.5 Further the court reasoned other
jurisdictions established retroactive child support may be awarded in timely filed paternity actions
initiated after the child reached the age of majority, and because the court has authority to order
support after paternity is established, a court has the authority to order retroactive child support.
Thus, because a parent may bring a paternity action up to 3 years after the child reaches the age of
majority, and because a court may order a parent to pay child support after paternity is established,
the court held that a parent has 3 years after the age of majority to seek retroactive child support.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the court held that a parent has 3 years after the child turns the age of majority to
seek retroactive child support. Hargrove’s request for retroactive child support was permitted
because her paternity action was brought 1 year and 3 months after G.W. turned 18, which is within
the period permitted by NRS 126.081(1). As Hargrove is permitted to bring a paternity action, she
was consistently permitted to seek retroactive child support. The district court therefore abused its
discretion by concluding it did not have the authority to grant retroactive child support. Ward,
however, did not make a promise in writing to make monthly support payments and the district
court correctly denied Hargrove’s NRS 126.900(1) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded this claim for further proceedings.
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